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Abstract
Privacy-Preserving Record Linkage (PPRL) supports the integration of sensitive information from multiple datasets,
in particular the privacy-preservingmatching of records referring to the same entity. PPRL has gained much attention
in many application areas, with the most prominent ones in the healthcare domain. PPRL techniques tackle this
problem by conducting linkage on masked (encoded) values. Employing PPRL on records from multiple (more than
two) parties/sources (multi-party PPRL, MP-PPRL) is an increasingly important but challenging problem that so far
has not been sufficiently solved. Existing MP-PPRL approaches are limited to finding only those entities that are
present in all parties thereby missing entities that match only in a subset of parties. Furthermore, previous MP-PPRL
approaches face substantial scalability limitations due to the need of a large number of comparisons between masked
records. We thus propose and evaluate new MP-PPRL approaches that find matches in any subset of parties and still
scale to many parties. Our approaches maintain all matches within clusters, where these clusters are incrementally
extended or refined by considering records from one party after the other. An empirical evaluation using multiple real
datasets ranging from 3 to 26 parties each containing up to 5 million records validates that our protocols are efficient,
and significantly outperform existing MP-PPRL approaches in terms of linkage quality and scalability.
Keywords: Data linkage, privacy, scalability, graph matching, multiple databases, subset matching
1. Introduction
With the widespread collection of large-scale person-
specific databases bymany organizations,multiple large
databases (held by different parties) often need to be
integrated and linked to identify matching records that
correspond to the same real-world entity [1, 2, 3] for
viable data mining and analytics applications. The
absence of unique entity identifiers across different
databases requires using commonly available personal
identifying attributes, such as names and addresses, for
integrating and linking records from those databases.
The values in these quasi-identifiers (QIDs) are often
dirty, i.e. contain errors and variations, or they can
be missing, which makes the linkage task challeng-
ing [4, 5]. In addition, such attributes often contain
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sensitive personal information about the entities to be
linked, and therefore sharing or exchanging such values
among different organizations is often prohibited due to
privacy and confidentiality concerns [6, 7, 8]. Address-
ing these challenges, privacy-preserving record linkage
(PPRL) has attracted increasing interest over the last
two decades [1, 8] and been employed in several real
applications.
For example, data from hospitals and clinical reg-
istries were linked with data from central cancer reg-
istries and from the Australian Bureau of Statistics us-
ing PPRL techniques for a study on surgical treatment
received by aboriginal and non-aboriginal people with
lung cancer [9]. Data from several cantonal and national
registries were linked in Switzerland using Bloom filter-
based PPRL to investigate long-term consequences of
childhood cancer [10]. In 2016, the Interdisciplinary
Committee of the International Rare Diseases Research
Consortium launched a task team to explore approaches
to PPRL for linking several genomic and clinical data
sets [11].
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Further, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in
the UK established the program ‘Beyond 2011’ to carry
out research to study the options for production of pop-
ulation and socio-demographics statistics for England
and Wales, by linking anonymous data to ensure that
high levels of privacy of data about people are main-
tained [12]. Another application of PPRL in the do-
main of national security is to integrate data from law
enforcement agencies, Internet service providers, busi-
nesses, as well as financial institutions, to enable identi-
fying crime and fraud, or of terrorism suspects [13].
The majority of linkage techniques and frameworks
have been developed for linking records from only two
databases [8, 14, 15]. It is not trivial to extend existing
PPRL techniques to multiple databases by sending the
encoded databases from all parties to a Linkage Unit
(LU), where a LU is an external party that has been
used in several existing PPRL approaches for conduct-
ing or facilitating the linkage of encoded records sent
to it by the database owners [8]. At the LU, it would
then become necessary to determine pair-wise similar-
ities between records and to group similar records into
clusters where one cluster is assumed to represent one
entity [16]. Only few basic grouping/clustering tech-
niques have been described for multi-database linkage,
with each of them having limitations as discussed in de-
tail in Section 6. Such clustering schemes have been
studied for general record linkage [16, 17, 18] but have
received almost no attention so far for PPRL.
Furthermore, sending all the encoded records from
multiple parties to the LU has privacy risks. For ex-
ample, with Bloom filter-based encoding [19] (to be
described in the next section), the more Bloom filters
the LU receives the more likely it will be able to attack
these Bloom filter databases using cryptanalysis attacks
because more frequency information will become avail-
able that can be exploited [20, 21].
Only few techniques have been developed that can
perform multi-party linkage in a privacy-preserving
context (i.e. MP-PPRL). The main drawbacks of these
small number of existing MP-PPRL approaches are that
they either (1) only consider the blocking step to re-
duce the matching space [22] but not how the match-
ing is done, (2) only support exact matching, which
classifies record sets as matches if their masked QIDs
are exactly the same [4], (3) are applicable to QIDs of
categorical data only (however, linkage using QIDs of
string data, such as names and addresses, is required in
many real applications [8, 23]), or (4) they do not sup-
port subset matching where records that match across
subsets of databases also need to be identified in addi-
tion to records that match across all databases. The pri-
mary challenge of MP-PPRL is the complexity of link-
age, which generally is exponential with the number of
databases to be linked and their sizes [24]. This chal-
lenge multiplies when matching records from any pos-
sible subset across databases need to be identified.
Contributions: In this paper, we propose an effi-
cient and scalable MP-PPRL protocol that allows sub-
set matching between multiple large databases using a
LU. LU-based approaches for PPRL are well suited for
efficient linking of multiple large databases for practical
applications, as the number of communication steps re-
quired among the database owners, as well as the risk of
information leakage from a sensitive database to other
database owners, are reduced when a LU is used [8].
We develop two variations of incremental cluster-
ing combined with a graph-based linkage for MP-PPRL
where clusters of encoded records are iteratively merged
and refined such that the output of clusters are the
matching sets of records (i.e. each cluster represents
a set of matching records that correspond to the same
entity). Clustering-based approaches are deemed most
suitable for holistic data integration, and have been used
in several non-PPRL approaches for scaling data inte-
gration to many sources [25, 26]. Compared to greedy
mapping [27] (as described in Section 3), our proposed
incremental clustering methods perform significantly
better in terms of linkage quality.
We use counting Bloom filter-based encoding [24]
which has lower risk of privacy leakage as the frequency
information available in counting Bloom filters is sig-
nificantly less than basic Bloom filters [24]. Addition-
ally, the risk of collusion between different parties and
the LU can be reduced in our incremental clustering ap-
proach by using different encoding parameters in differ-
ent iterations, as we discuss in Section 4.2.
We provide a comprehensive evaluation of our pro-
posed approach which shows that it has a quadratic
computation complexity in the size and the number of
the databases that are linked. This complexity is signifi-
cantly lower compared to the exponential complexity of
existing MP-PPRL approaches [23, 24, 28], as we the-
oretically and empirically validate in Sections 4 and 5
using large real voter and health datasets.
Outline: In Section 2 we provide the required pre-
liminaries and in Section 3 we describe our protocol for
MP-PPRL. We analyze our protocol in terms of com-
plexity, privacy, and linkage quality in Section 4, and
validate these analyses through an empirical evaluation
in Section 5. We discuss related work in MP-PPRL in
Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper with an out-
look to future research directions in Section 7.
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2. Preliminaries
In this section, we define the problem of MP-PPRL
and describe the preliminaries required for our protocol.
Definition 2.1 (MP-PPRL). Assume P1, . . . , Pp are
the p owners (parties) of the deduplicated databases
D1, . . . ,Dp, respectively. MP-PPRL allows the par-
ties Pi to determine which of their records ri,x ∈ Di
match with records in other database(s) r j,y ∈ D j with
1 ≤ i, j ≤ p and j , i based on the (masked or encoded)
quasi-identifiers (QIDs) of these records. The output
of this process is a set M of match clusters, where a
match cluster c ∈ M contains a maximum of one record
from each database and 1 < |c| ≤ p. Each c ∈ M is
identified as a set of matching records representing the
same real-world entity. The parties do not wish to reveal
their actual records with any other party. They however
are prepared to disclose to each other, or to an external
party (such as a researcher), the actual values of some
selected attributes of the record sets that are in M to
allow further analysis.
We assume that the individual databases do not con-
tain any duplicates (i.e. multiple records about the
same patient). Each party performs the necessary
pre-processing steps including deduplication to ensure
the quality of their own database. Many dedupli-
cation techniques have been developed in the litera-
ture [4, 29] which can be used for deduplicating individ-
ual databases before linking them across different par-
ties (such that there is only one record per entity/patient
in a database, and therefore a record in one database can
match to only one record in another database).
We also assume that a private blocking, indexing, or
filtering technique is being used by the database own-
ers [23, 30, 31, 32]. Such techniques are being used
in general linkage and PPRL to reduce the number of
comparisons by grouping records according to a certain
criteria and limiting the comparison only to the records
in the same group [4, 8], or by pruning record pairs/sets
that are potential non-matches according to some crite-
ria [32]. Note that blocking is not a focus of our paper,
and that we assume that the private blocking technique
used by the database owners is secure [1].
Since QIDs that are generally used for linking (e.g.
names and addresses) contain personal and sensitive in-
formation about individuals, PPRL needs to be con-
ducted on the encoded or masked versions of these
QIDs. Any masking (encoding) function mask(·) can
be used in our privacy-preserving linkage protocol to
encode attribute values, as long as the same mask(·)
function is used by all database owners Pi to mask their
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Figure 1: An example similarity (Dice coefficient) calcula-
tion of two strings masked using Bloom filter (BF) encoding,
where l = 14, k = 2, and q = 2, as described in Section 2.
databases Di into D
M
i
, where 1 ≤ i ≤ p. We describe
our protocol using the Bloom filter (BF) encoding tech-
nique, which is widely used in both research and practi-
cal applications of PPRL [8, 33, 34]. We also provide an
improved solution for privacy-preservation in the multi-
party context using counting Bloom filter (CBF) encod-
ing [24].
Definition 2.2 (BF encoding). A BF bi is a bit vector
of length l bits where all bits are initially set to 0. k
independent hash functions, h1, . . . , hk, each with range
1, . . . l, are used to map each of the elements s in a set
S into the BF by setting the bit positions h j(s) with 1 ≤
j ≤ k to 1.
For string matching, the q-grams (sub-strings of
length q) of QID values (that contain textual data, such
as names and addresses) of each record ri,x in the
databases to be linked Di, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, are hash-
mapped into the BF bi,x using k independent hash func-
tions [35]. Figure 1 illustrates the encoding of bigrams
(q = 2) of two QID values ‘sarah’ and ‘sara’ into l = 14
bits long BFs using k = 2 hash functions. The set of
bigrams is first extracted from the string (e.g. {’sa’, ’ar’,
’ra’, ’ah’} for ’sarah’) and then each bigram in the set is
hashed using k = 2 hash functions to set the correspond-
ing two indices in the BF to 1 (e.g. hash-mapping bi-
gram ’sa’ results in setting the 1st and 7th bit positions to
1). For numerical data, the neighbouring values (within
a certain interval) of QID values are hash-mapped into
the BF using k hash functions [36, 37]. Collision of
hash-mapping occurs (for example, the bigrams ’sa’ and
’ra’ are mapped to the same 7th bit position in Figure 1),
which improves privacy of the encoding at the cost of
loss in utility due to false positives.
In order to allow fuzzy/approximate matching of
masked QIDs to perform record linkage in the pres-
ence of typographical errors and variations, the simi-
larity/distance between the encoded values needs to be
calculated [4, 8]. The similarity of records masked into
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BFs can be calculated either distributively across all
database owners [23, 38] or by a linkage unit [6, 35].
Any set-based similarity function (such as overlap, Jac-
card, and Dice coefficient) [4] can be used to calcu-
late the similarity of pairs or sets (multiple) of BFs. In
PPRL, the Dice coefficient has been used for matching
of BFs since it is insensitive to many matching zeros
(bit positions to which no elements are hash-mapped)
in long BFs [35].
Definition 2.3 (Dice coefficient similarity). The Dice
coefficient similarity of p (p ≥ 2) BFs (b1, · · · , bp) is:
sim(b1, · · · , bp) =
p × z∑p
i=1
xi
, (1)
where z is the number of common bit positions that are
set to 1 in all p BFs (common 1-bits), and xi is the num-
ber of bit positions set to 1 in bi (1-bits), 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
For the example Bloom filter pair shown in Figure 1,
the number of common 1-bits is 5 and the number of 1-
bits in the two Bloom filters are 7 and 5, respectively,
and therefore the Dice coefficient similarity is calcu-
lated as 2 × 5/(7 + 5) = 0.83.
Definition 2.4 (CBF encoding). A counting Bloom fil-
ter (CBF) c is an integer vector of length l bits that con-
tains the counts of values in each bit position. Multiple
BFs can be summarized into a single CBF c, such that
c[β] =
∑p
i=1
bi[β], where β, 1 ≤ β ≤ l. c[β] is the count
value in the β bit position of the CBF c and bi[β] ∈ [0, 1]
provides the value in the bit position β of BF bi. Given
p BFs (bit vectors) bi with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, the CBF c can
be generated by applying a vector addition operation
between the bit vectors such that c =
∑
i bi.
Theorem 2.1. The Dice coefficient similarity of p BFs
can be calculated given only their corresponding CBF
as:
sim(c) =
p × |{β : c[β] = p, 1 ≤ β ≤ l}|
∑l
β=1 c[β]
(2)
Proof 2.2. The Dice coefficient similarity of p BFs
(b1,b2, · · ·, bp) is determined by the sum of 1-bits
(
∑p
i=1
xi) in the denominator of Eq. (1) and the number
of common 1-bits (z) in all p BFs in the nominator of
Eq. (1). The number of 1-bits in a BF bi is xi = bi[1] +
bi[2]+ · · ·+bi[l], with 1 ≤ i ≤ p. The sum of 1-bits in all
p BFs is therefore
∑p
i=1
xi =
∑p
i=1
bi[1]+bi[2]+· · ·+bi[l].
The value in a bit position β (1 ≤ β ≤ l) of the CBF
of these p BFs is c[β] = b1[β] + b2[β] + · · · + bp[β].
b2 1 1111 0 0 0 0 0 0000
1 1101 0 0 0 1 0 1000b3
b1 1 1111 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Dice_sim = 3 x 418
= 0.67c 3 3320 0 0 1 1 20003
Figure 2: An example similarity (Dice coefficient) calculation
of three BFs using their CBF, as described in Section 2.
The sum of values in all bit positions of the CBF is∑l
β=1 c[β] =
∑l
β=1 b1[β] + b2[β] + · · · + bp[β] which is
equal to
∑p
i=1
xi =
∑p
i=1
bi[1] + bi[2] + · · · + bi[l]. Fur-
ther, if a bit position β (1 ≤ β ≤ l) contains 1 in all
p BFs, i.e. ∀
p
i=1
bi[β] = 1, then c[β] =
∑p
i=1
bi[β] = p.
Therefore, the common 1-bits (z) that occur in all p BFs
can be calculated by counting the number of positions
β ∈ c where c[β] = p, while the sum of the number of
1-bits (
∑p
i=1
xi) is calculated by summing the values in
all bit positions β ∈ c,
∑l
β=1 c[β].
Figure 2 shows an example of using CBF to calculate
the similarity of p = 3 BFs (b1, b2, and b3). The CBF c
contains the aggregated counts from the three BFs. The
number of common 1-bits in all three BFs is 4 because 4
indices in c contain the count of 3, and the total number
of 1-bits in all three BFs is 18, which is the sum of the
counts in c. Hence, the Dice coefficient similarity is
calculated as 3 × 4/18 = 0.67. As will be described in
Sections 3.3 and 4.2, CBFs provide improved privacy
compared to BFs in a multi-party context [24].
3. MP-PPRL Protocol
Our protocol allows the efficient identification of
matching records from several (two or more) databases
held by different parties. We use an incremental graph-
based clustering approach to achieve efficient linking
of multiple large databases by reducing the exponential
comparison space required by traditional linkage meth-
ods [8, 22]. The explosion in the number of record pair
comparisons required with increasing number of large
databases necessitates a transition from batch to incre-
mental clustering methods, which process one database
at a time and typically store only a small subset of the
data as potential matching records [39].
Overview: Masked/encoded database records are
represented by the vertices in a graph and the similar-
ities between compared records are represented by the
edges. As we describe below, the databases are ordered
using an ordering function to determine in which order
4
the databases are to be processed for incremental clus-
tering. The aim of incremental clustering is to incre-
mentally cluster/group vertices such that similar records
from different databases are grouped into one cluster.
Vertices containing similar records are identified by us-
ing a similarity function. As we describe in Sections 3.1
and 3.2, we propose two mapping functions that per-
form clustering by merging and/or splitting vertices in
the graph. The final output of our protocol is a clus-
ter graph whose vertices are clusters containing simi-
lar records, or vertices containing a single record that is
not matched with any other records. Each cluster/vertex
in the final cluster graph corresponds to one real-world
entity. Records within each cluster can be linked as
matches and used for further analysis. In the following
we describe our protocol in detail.
Definition 3.1 (Cluster graph). A cluster graph G is
a p-partite graph that contains a set S of non-empty
independent sets Vi with 1 ≤ i ≤ p containing ver-
tices/nodes, and a set E of unordered pairs of vertices
each representing an undirected edge between a pair
of vertices vx and vy such that vx ∈ Vi and vy ∈ V j
with i , j. The vertex v can be considered as a clus-
ter containing either a single masked record (singleton)
or a set of masked records after merging vertices. An
edge e ∈ E represents the similarity sim(vx, vy) between
masked records in the two vertices vx and vy.
Following Definition 3.1, the records from all
databases D1, · · · ,Dp are represented as vertices in a
cluster graph G, and they are incrementally clustered
such that at the end of our protocol each cluster con-
tains a set of matching records from different parties.
During incremental clustering we have to assign records
of a newly considered party to the already determined
clusters of previously matched parties. In general, new
records might be similar to several such clusters so that
there is a many-to-many match relationship between
the set X of already existing clusters and the set Y of
new records as shown in Figure 3 (left-hand side). Our
goal, however, is to identify the best one-to-one map-
ping for such matches (Figure 3 (right-hand side)) since
the databases are assumed to be deduplicated, and there-
fore only one-to-one true mapping can exist between
records from different databases.
Such one-to-one mappings between the vertices in G
can be determined by either (1) a greedy approach or
(2) an optimal mapping approach that ensures that each
record (vertex) is matched with only the best match-
ing record/records from other parties. Given two lists
of (unassigned) vertices X and Y, the greedy approach
y1
y3
y2
x1
x3
x2
y1
y3
y2
x1
x3
x2
X Y
0.9
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.9
O
Figure 3: An example of optimal one-to-one mapping (defined
in Section 3) using the Hungarian algorithm [40].
scans through the vertices in X and assigns them to the
best matching vertex in Y that is not yet assigned to any
other vertex according to their similarity. The greedy
approach is not optimal, because when assigning a ver-
tex x ∈ X to a vertex in Y only the similarities between
x and unassigned vertices in Y are considered while ne-
glecting the similarities of the other vertices in X with
vertices in Y. Moreover, similar to the best link group-
ing method proposed by Kendrick [27] (as described in
Section 6), greedy mapping depends on the ordering of
the vertices/nodes as they are processed.
In our protocol, we therefore use the optimalmapping
approach using the Hungarian algorithm [40], which is
a combinatorial algorithm for solving the optimal as-
signment problem in polynomial time. Given two sets
of vertices, X and Y, the algorithm determines the opti-
mal one-to-one mapping by assigning a vertex in X to a
maximum of one vertex in Y such that the overall simi-
larity between all assigned vertices is maximized:
Definition 3.2 (Optimal mapping). Given two sets of
vertices, X and Y, along with a similarity function
sim(xi ∈ X, y j ∈ Y). Identify a bijection O : X → Y
such that
∑
xi,y j∈O
sim(xi, y j) (3)
is maximized.
An illustrative example of optimal one-to-one map-
ping is shown in Figure 3. For example, x1 has the high-
est similarity with y1 of sim(x1, y1) = 0.9 while with y2
the similarity is sim(x1, y2) = 0.8. With greedymapping
(assuming the order of processing as x1 first and then x2
followed by x3), x1 is mapped to y1 and therefore x2
needs to be mapped to y2, and x3 with y3. This gives a
total summed similarity of 2.5 (Eq. 3). However, with
the optimal one-to-one mapping, x1 is mapped with y2
and x2 with y1 while x3 is still mapped to y3, resulting
in a total similarity value of 2.6 (which is better than the
greedy mapping). If |X| , |Y |, abs(|X| − |Y |) vertices re-
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main not mapped to any vertices after one-to-one map-
ping is applied.
The proof of Kuhn-Munkres theorem states that for
any matching O and any feasible labelling O′ (such as
greedy mapping), it holds [40]
w(O) =
∑
e∈O
w(e) >=
∑
e′∈O′
w(e′), (4)
where w(·) denotes the weight function of an edge.
Therefore, O is the optimal mapping in terms of max-
imizing edge weights (similarities in our context). We
will experimentally evaluate the greedy as well as the
optimal mapping approaches in Section 5.
We three initial steps of our MP-PPRL protocol are:
(1) All database owners mask (encode) their database
records using the same masking function mask(·).
This can, for example, be BF encoding, as described
in Section 2.
(2) To reduce the comparison space, a blocking func-
tion block(·) is applied on the database records (in-
dividually by the database owners) to group similar
records into the same block according to some cri-
teria (known as blocking key) [4, 30]. All records
that have the same (or a similar) blocking key value
(BKV) are grouped into the same block. For exam-
ple, phonetic-based or multi-bit tree-based blocking
can be used as the block(·) function [4, 30, 35].
(3) The masked records (DM
i
) along with their blocks
(Bi) are sent to a linkage unit (LU) to conduct the
linkage of these masked records using the graph-
based incremental clustering approach. At the LU,
the records are processed block by block (i.e. each
block B ∈ B is considered as one graph GB, where
B contains the union of all Bi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p).
We propose two different methods for incremental
clustering in the graphs GB: (1) early mapping and (2)
late mapping. We first present the steps involved in the
incremental clustering approach with early mapping in
Section 3.1 and then the late mapping-based approach
in Section 3.2. While both approaches incrementally
merge records from different parties, they differ in when
they apply the one-to-one mapping restriction. With
early mapping this restriction is continually observed
such that every record is only assigned to a single cluster
and the number of records per cluster never exceeds the
number of parties. By contrast, late mapping assigns
records to all clusters for which a minimum similarity
is exceeded so that there may temporarily be overlap-
ping clusters and clusters with several records from the
same party. The one-to-one restriction is then enforced
at the end of the algorithm in a separate mapping phase.
Both approaches have a trade-off between complexity
and linkage quality, as we will discuss in Section 4.
As will be detailed in the following two sections, the
inputs to the incremental clustering algorithm are: p
masked databases DM
i
(with 1 ≤ i ≤ p), the union of
blocks from all parties B = ∪iBi, a similarity func-
tion sim(·) for calculating similarities between vertices
in GB, an ordering function ord(·) for ordering the
databases to be processed, a mapping function map(·)
for one-to-one mapping between vertices in GB (early
mapping, late mapping, or the naı¨ve greedy mapping), a
minimum similarity threshold st to connect two vertices
in GB by an edge (if their similarity is at least st), and
the minimum subset size sm (sm ≤ p), i.e. the minimum
number of records that each final cluster must contain.
The databases need to be ordered using the ord(·)
function for incremental clustering. The ordering can
be either (a) random, (b) according to their sizes in de-
scending order so that a smaller number of merging will
be required, or (c) depending on their data quality of the
respective databases in descending order so that the ini-
tial clusters will be of higher quality leading to higher
linkage quality [41].
3.1. Early mapping-based clustering
The early mapping-based clustering incrementally
adds records in each database to the corresponding ver-
tices in the graph by identifying the one-to-onemapping
between vertices and records and then merging them.
To achieve the one-to-one mapping we apply the Hun-
garian algorithm [40] according to Definition 3.2 en-
suring that a record from one database is matched to a
maximum of one cluster of previously matched records
and that clusters in the graph are non-overlapping (i.e.
∀(vi, v j) ∈ GB : vi ∩ v j = ∅).
Selecting the optimal cluster to which a record should
be added is based on the similarities between two ver-
tices of the cluster graph and a minimum similarity
threshold st. In other words, two vertices vi, v j ∈ GB
are only merged into one if sim(vi, v j) ≥ st. The sim-
ilarity between two singletons can easily be calculated
using a similarity function, for example the Dice coef-
ficient similarity, to compare the singletons containing
records masked into BFs (as described in Section 2).
The similarity between a cluster c that contains more
than one record and a singleton v consisting of a sin-
gle masked record can be calculated in several ways, in-
cluding maximum similarity (single linkage), minimum
similarity (complete linkage), or average similarity. We
use the average similarity function in this work in order
6
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Figure 4: An example of early mapping-based incremental clustering, as described in Section 3.1. Edges represent a similarity value
between vertices of at least the similarity threshold st (st = 0.75 in this example). The similarity values shown here are made-up
example values. Different colors represent different final clusters and how they are iteratively mapped and merged.
to consider data errors and variations, as well as possible
variations of the masking function (such as Bloom filter
collisions [19]) while not compromising computational
efficiency. We leave studying other similarity functions
for our incremental clustering as a future work.
Definition 3.3 (Average similarity). The average sim-
ilarity between a cluster c and a (masked) record ri,x (in
a singleton) is
simavg(c, ri,x) =
∑
r j,y∈c
sim(r j,y, ri,x)
|c|
, (5)
with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ p, i , j, and |c| ≥ 1.
The early mapping-based approach involves p − 1 it-
erations to perform one-to-one mapping and merging
between records from p parties. An overview of our
clustering approach with early one-to-one mapping is
illustrated for linking p = 4 databases (p − 1 = 3 itera-
tions) in Figure 4 and outlined in Algorithm 1. The steps
of our protocol with early mapping-based clustering are
(continuing after the initial steps (1) to (3)):
(4) The LU conducts linkage of masked records in
databases DM
1
, · · · ,DMp from p parties. These
databases are ordered (using the ord(·) function in
line 2 in Algorithm 1) for incremental clustering.
For each block B ∈ B, the masked records in B of
the first party P1 are added into a graphGB as sepa-
rate vertices (lines 3 to 9 in Algorithm 1). Then the
second party P2’s masked records are inserted into
GB as separate vertices and the similarities between
vertices of the first party and the second party are
calculated (lines 10 to 13). If the similarity between
two vertices is at least a minimum threshold st an
edge is created between the corresponding vertices
(as shown in Figure 4 for st = 0.75 and described in
lines 14 and 15 in Algorithm 1).
(5) The optimal one-to-onemapping (as defined in Sec-
tion 2) is applied in every iteration i (with 1 ≤ i ≤
p − 1) after edges between the records from party
Pi+1 (singletons) and clusters of records from par-
ties P1 to Pi have been added. This optimal map-
ping connects only two highly matching vertices,
complying with the assumption of deduplication.
All the edges e ∈ GB.E that are not matching after
the optimal mapping are removed fromGB (lines 16
to 19).
(6) The vertices that are connected by an edge are then
merged into one (lines 20 and 21), while the vertices
that do not have any connecting edge (those that are
not matching to any vertices in the other databases)
are kept as unclustered vertices.
In our running example shown in Figure 4, the opti-
mal mapping (according to the objective function 3)
between records of parties P1 and P2 (based on the
similarity values) in the first iteration leads to their
respective records r1,1 and r2,2 to be merged into a
single cluster, while r1,2 from P1 is not clustered
with any vertices from P2. Similarly, r1,3 and r2,3,
and r1,4 and r2,1 are merged into clusters.
(7) The LU then proceeds with the masked records in
B of the next (third) party which are first inserted
into GB as separate vertices (singletons). Then the
similarities between these vertices and the clustered
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Algorithm 1: Early mapping-based incremental clustering (Section 3.1)
Input:
- DM
i
: Party Pi’s BFs along with their BKVs, 1 ≤ i ≤ p
- B : Blocks containing the union of blocks from all parties
- sim : Similarity function
- ord : Ordering function for incremental processing of databases
- map : One-to-one mapping function
- st : Minimum similarity threshold to classify record sets
- sm : Minimum subset size, with 2 ≤ sm ≤ p
Output:
-M : Matching record sets (clusters)
1: clus ID = 0;G = {};M = {} // Initialization
2: DBs = ord([DM
1
,DM
2
, · · · ,DMp ]) // Order databases
3: for B ∈ B do: // Iterate blocks
4: GB = {} // Graph for block B
5: for i ∈ [1, 2, · · · p] do: // Iterate parties
6: if i == 1 do: // First party
7: for rec ∈ DBs[i] do: // Iterate records
8: clus ID+ = 1
9: GB[clus ID] = [DBs[i][rec]] // Add vertices
10: if i > 1 do: // Other parties
11: for rec ∈ DBs[i] do: // Iterate records
12: for c ∈ GB do: // Iterate vertices
13: sim val = sim(rec, c) // Calculate similarity
14: if sim val ≥ st then:
15: GB.add edge(c, rec) // Add edges
16: opt E = map(GB .E) // 1-to-1 mapping
17: for e ∈ GB .E do: // Iterate edges
18: if e < opt E then:
19: GB .remove(e) // Prune edges
20: for e ∈ GB .E do: // Remaining edges
21: GB .merge(get vertices(e)) //Merge cluster vertices
22: G.add(GB) // Add B’s clusters to G
23: for c ∈ G do: // Iterate final clusters
24: if |c| ≥ sm then: // Size at least sm
25: M.add(c) // Add toM
26: returnM // OutputM
vertices and singletons from the previous parties’
masked records are calculated and an edge is cre-
ated connecting those vertices that have a similar-
ity above the minimum threshold st (lines 10 to 15
in Algorithm 1). An optimal one-to-one mapping
is then applied again between the vertices from all
previous parties and the new singleton vertices of
the current party in lines 16 to 19. For example
in Figure 4, in iteration 2 the singleton vertex with
record r3,3 of the current party P3 and the clustered
vertex containing records (r1,3, r2,3) of previous par-
ties P1 and P2, respectively, are merged. Similarly,
r3,1 is merged with the cluster containing r1,1 and
r2,2 from previous parties, while r3,2 is merged with
r1,2, as this gives the optimal mapping (according to
Equation 3).
(8) The vertices connected by an edge after one-to-
one mapping (highly matching vertices) at an iter-
ation are merged into one, while the vertices (both
clustered and singletons) that are not matching to
any other vertices remain as unclustered vertices
(lines 20 and 21). For example, the vertex with
record r3,4 of party P3 and the clustered vertex con-
taining records (r1,4, r2,1) of parties P1 and P2, re-
Algorithm 2: Late mapping-based incremental clustering (Section 3.2)
Input:
- DM
i
: Party Pi’s BFs along with their BKVs, 1 ≤ i ≤ p
- B : Blocks containing the union of blocks from all parties
- sim : Similarity function
- ord : Ordering function for incremental processing of databases
- map : One-to-one mapping function
- st : Minimum similarity threshold to classify record sets
- sm : Minimum subset size, with 2 ≤ sm ≤ p
Output:
-M : Matching record sets (clusters)
1: clus ID = 0;G = {};M = {} // Initialization
2: for B ∈ B do: // Iterate blocks
3: GB = {} // Graph for block B
4: for i ∈ [1, 2, · · · p] do: // Iterate parties
5: if i == 1 do: // First party
6: for rec ∈ DM
i
do: // Iterate records
7: clus ID+ = 1
8: GB[clus ID] = [D
M
i
[rec]] // Add vertices
9: if i > 1 do: // Other parties
10: for rec ∈ DM
i
do: // Iterate records
11: for c ∈ GB do: // Iterate vertices
12: sim val = sim(rec, c) // Calculate similarity
13: if sim val ≥ st then:
14: GB .add edge(c, rec) // Add edges
15: for e ∈ GB.E do: // Iterate edges
16: GB .merge(get vertices(e)) //Merge cluster vertices
17: DBs = ord([DM
1
,DM
2
, · · · ,DMp ]) // Order databases
18: for i ∈ [1, 2, · · · p] do: // Iterate parties
19: GB .split(DBs[i].recs) // Split this party’s records
20: opt E = map(GB .E) // 1-to-1 mapping
21: for e ∈ opt E do:
22: GB .merge(get vertices(e)) //Merge cluster vertices
23: G.add(GB) // Add B’s clusters to G
24: for c ∈ G do: // Iterate final clusters
25: if |c| ≥ sm then: // Size at least sm
26: M.add(c) // Add toM
27: returnM // OutputM
spectively, are not merged with any other vertices
in iteration 2, as shown in Figure 4.
(9) This process of mapping and merging of vertices is
repeated until the masked records of all parties are
processed (i.e. p − 1 iterations for each block). The
output will be clusters (final vertices in graph GB)
that either have records from all p parties, or a sub-
set of p parties, or only one record from a single
party. The final clusters of block B (i.e. vertices in
graph GB) are added to G (line 22). Based on the
minimum subset size sm required by the MP-PPRL
protocol, all the vertices that have a size of at least
sm (i.e. vertices containing matching records from
at least sm parties) are added to the final match-
ing set of records M (lines 23 to 26). For exam-
ple, if sm = 3 in our running example, then M will
contain only three clusters which are (r1,1, r2,2, r3,1),
(r1,2, r3,2, r4,3), and (r1,3, r2,3, r3,3, r4,1).
3.2. Late mapping-based clustering
The early mapping-based approach (described in the
previous section) is efficient in terms of the number of
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Figure 5: An example of the splitting and one-to-one mapping phases of late mapping-based incremental clustering, as described
in Section 3.2. The similarity values shown here are made-up example values (with the similarity threshold st = 0.75). Different
colors represent different final clusters and how they are iteratively split from merged clusters and mapped.
comparisons required, as we will discuss in Section 4.
However, since the optimal mapping is conducted be-
tween the records of a database and only the records
from the previously processed databases, early mapping
can potentially lead to a reduction of the quality of the
final linkage results. In this section, we propose a late
mapping-based approach to improve linkage quality at
the cost of more comparisons.
In addition to one-to-one mapping and merging ver-
tices (as described for the early mapping approach in the
previous section), the late mapping approach involves a
third phase, which is splitting vertices.
Splitting vertices: Records ri,x that belong to a
database Di in a cluster c are split into singletons con-
taining the records ri,x, while the remaining records
from other databases r j,y ∈ D j are kept in c (with
1 ≤ i, j ≤ p and i , j).
We next describe the steps of late mapping-based
clustering (continuing after the initial steps (1) to (3)).
It requires p − 1 iterations first to merge records from
p parties, and then p iterations for splitting and apply-
ing one-to-one mapping, as illustrated in Figure 5 and
outlined in Algorithm 2.
(4) For each block B, the masked records in B of the
first party Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ p) (in any order) are added
into a graph GB as separate vertices (lines 2 to 8 in
Algorithm 2). Then the second party P2’s masked
records are inserted into the graph GB as separate
vertices and the similarities between these single-
ton vertices of P1 and P2 are calculated (lines 9 to
12). If the similarity between two vertices is at least
st, then an edge is created between them (as shown
in Figure 5 and described in lines 13 and 14 in Al-
gorithm 2).
(5) This leads to several many-to-many matched ver-
tices between the two parties, P1 and P2, since no
early optimal mapping is applied. The vertices that
are connected by an edge are then merged into one
cluster (lines 15 and 16), while the vertices that do
not have any connecting edge (those that are not
matching to any vertices in the other database) are
kept as unclustered vertices.
(6) The LU then proceeds with the masked records of
the remaining parties, where the records are first
added inGB as singleton vertices, and then the sim-
ilarities between these singletons and the clusters
from all previous parties’ masked records are cal-
culated and an edge is created connecting those ver-
tices that have a similarity of at least the minimum
threshold st (lines 9 to 14). The vertices connected
by an edge are merged into one (lines 15 and 16),
while the vertices that are not matching to any other
vertices remain as unclustered vertices.
(7) This process of merging vertices is repeated un-
til the masked records of all parties are processed
(i.e. p − 1 iterations for each block). The output
will be clusters that are overlapping, which means
a record from one party might be in several clus-
ters (i.e. matching with several sets of records from
other parties). In the example shown in Figure 5,
the merged clusters are overlapping. For example,
r1,1 is in two clusters and r3,4 in 3 clusters. Since the
databases are deduplicated, a record must be match-
ing only to one set of records from other databases.
Therefore a late one-to-onemapping needs to be ap-
plied on all clusters.
(8) In order to conduct late one-to-one mapping, the
parties are ordered using the ord(·) function (sim-
ilar to the early mapping approach), and the records
of the first party in the ordered list are split from
the clusters into singleton vertices (one vertex for
each unique record) using the split(·) function in
lines 17 to 19. In the example in Figure 5, records
from party P1 are split from the merged clusters
into singletons in iteration 1. The optimal one-to-
one mapping is then applied between the singletons
and the clusters containing unique sets of records
from other parties (lines 20 to 22). The number of
edges generated for mapping in each iteration corre-
sponds to the number of clusters that appear before
splitting in that iteration. In the running example
shown in Figure 5, the number of clusters before it-
eration 1 is 8 (initial merged clusters) and therefore
iteration 1 generates 8 edges between P1’s single-
tons and other parties’ clusters. This results in the
first party’s records being clustered with the highly
matching set of records from other parties. For ex-
ample, r1,1 is mapped and merged with the cluster
containing (r2,2, r3,1), while r1,2 is merged with the
cluster of records (r2,1, r3,2).
The process is repeated for all parties (p iterations)
in the ordered list until the set of non-overlapping
clusters is obtained. As shown in Figure 5, the set
of non-overlapping clusters are generated after 3 it-
erations of splitting and merging of clusters (with
one party’s records at an iteration) for linking p = 3
databases.
It is important to note that late mapping requires
more cluster comparisons than early mapping, as
it does not prune edges at an early stage poten-
tially leading to many merged clusters. However,
it potentially results in better linkage quality since
the late one-to-one mapping considers all parties’
records, unlike in early one-to-one mapping where
only the previous parties’ records are considered.
(9) The final (non-overlapping) clusters of block B (i.e.
vertices in graph GB) are added to G (line 23). The
final clusters c ∈ G with |c| ≥ sm (i.e. vertices con-
taining matching records from at least sm parties)
are added to the final matching set of records M
(lines 24 to 27).
3.3. Improving Privacy
Our clustering-based MP-PPRL protocol can be used
with any encoding/masking technique, such as BF en-
coding [19] as used in the example described in Fig-
ure 1. BF encoding is one of the widely used meth-
ods in PPRL due to its efficiency compared to cryp-
tographic methods and controllable/tunable privacy-
accuracy trade-off [8, 19, 34].
However, BFs are susceptible to inference attacks
by adversaries as has been shown in several stud-
ies [20, 21, 42, 43]. Counting Bloom filter (CBF), a
variation of BF (as described in Section 2), provides
improved privacy guarantees compared to BF for multi-
party PPRL [24]. We therefore adapt the CBF-based ap-
proach for our protocol to improve privacy against infer-
ence attacks. Instead of all parties sending their records’
BFs to a LU, they can generate CBFs from the BFs us-
ing a secure summation protocol, as shown in Figure 6.
For example, in the first iteration the first two parties
participate in a secure summation protocol [2] with a
LU and generate CBFs for every pair of BFs.
In the basic secure summation protocol [2], the LU
provides a random vector R to the first party, which adds
its BF b1 to R and sends the summed vector b1 + R to
the second party. The second party then adds its BF b2
to the received sum and sends back the final summed
vector b1 + b2 + R to the LU. The LU subtracts the
random vector R from the received sum to generate the
CBF c = b1 + b2. Using the generated CBFs, the LU
calculates the similarities of pairs of BFs from the two
parties (Equation 2).
In the second iteration the LU already has the possi-
ble matches (clusters) from the first two parties. A se-
cure summation protocol is then used by the first three
parties and the LU to generate CBFs from all matches
identified in the first iteration along with every BF from
the third party. Note that every iteration requires differ-
ent BF encoding by the corresponding parties to avoid
the LU learning the new party’s BFs. This is repeated
until all parties’ records are compared by the LU.
As discussed in Section 4.2 in detail, CBFs are less
vulnerable to inference attacks. However, they incur
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Figure 6: An example of using CBFs generated from two BFs b1 and b2 from two respective parties P1 and P2 using a secure
summation protocol for similarity calculation, as described in Section 3.3.
memory cost (l×⌈log2(p)⌉ for p BFs of l bits) as well as
communication costs. Every ith iteration requires i + 1
communication steps in the secure summation protocol
(for example, when p = 2, the number of communica-
tion steps required for secure summation is 3, as illus-
trated in Figure 6) to generate the CBFs.
4. Analysis of the Protocol
In this section we analyze our MP-PPRL protocol
with regard to complexity, privacy, and linkage quality.
4.1. Complexity Analysis
Assume p parties participate in the linkage of their
respective databases, each containing n records, and
b blocks are generated by the blocking function, each
block containing n/b records. In step (1) of our proto-
col (as described in Section 3), masking records (with g
average q-grams per record) into BFs of length l using k
hash functions for n records is O(n · g · k) for each party.
Blocking the databases in step (2) hasO(n) computation
andO(p·b) communication complexity (assuming b ≤ n
blocks) at each party. In step (3), nmasked records from
p parties need to be sent to the LU for conducting the
linkage, which is ofO(p ·n) communication complexity.
The early mapping-based approach for incremental
clustering has guaranteed quadratic worst case compu-
tation complexity in both p and n. The worst case
(in terms of the number of comparisons required) oc-
curs with early one-to-one mapping in two ways: when
merging vertices from a database Di with the vertices
in the graph G, (a) no vertices (records) in Di match
with vertices in G resulting in n additional singleton
vertices in every iteration, or (b) every vertex/record
in Di matches with a vertex in G resulting in n ver-
tices with one additional record in every iteration lead-
ing to n final vertices containing p records. The pro-
tocol requires p − 1 iterations for mapping and merg-
ing records from p databases in each of the b blocks.
Generally, comparing n records from DM
i
with vertices
in G in the worst case is of O((i − 1)n2/b), with 1 ≤
i ≤ p. Therefore, the total worst case complexity is
O(n2/b + 2n2/b + 3n2/b + · · · + (p − 1)n2/b), which is
O(n2/b · p2).
The late mapping-based approach has an exponen-
tial computation complexity in the worst case scenario
assuming each record from a database is matched to
all records in all other databases (due to the many-to-
many matching), leading to O(b · (n/b)p) overlapping
final clusters each containing p records. However, as-
suming the databases are individually deduplicated (as
discussed in Section 2) and an appropriate similarity
threshold is used for merging clusters, only a small
number of additional clusters (owith o ≪ n2) are gener-
ally generated in each iteration (n+omerged clusters in
total). This leads to an average computation complexity
ofO(n(n)/b+n(n+o)/b+2n(n+o)/b+ · · ·+(p−1)n(n+
o)/b) = p(p−1)·n·(n+o)/b,which isO(p2 ·(n2+no)/b).
Therefore, the computation complexity of late mapping
in the average case is quadratic in both p and n.
Overall, our MP-PPRL protocol has a worst-case
quadratic computation complexity and a linear com-
munication complexity in the number of records n and
databases p, which are both significantly lower than
the exponential complexities of earlier MP-PPRL pro-
tocols [23, 24, 28]. Please note that extending ex-
isting PPRL techniques (that can link two databases
with quadratic complexity) to multi-database linkage re-
quires the additional step of clustering once the pair-
wise similarities have been calculated. Investigating
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other clustering algorithms that have been developed for
record linkage [16, 17, 18] in the context of MP-PPRL
is subject to future research.
4.2. Privacy Analysis
As with most existing PPRL approaches, we assume
that all parties follow the honest-but-curious adversary
model [44], where the parties follow the protocol while
being curious to find out as much as possible about
the other parties’ data by means of inference attacks on
masked records or by colluding with other parties [45].
We assume the private blocking technique used (as a
black box) does not reveal any sensitive information
to any parties, and the blocks generated meet the re-
quired privacy guarantees, such that each block contains
at least a minimum number (k) of records [45] or are dif-
ferentially private [46], to overcome frequency attacks.
In the matching step the parties send their masked
records (BFs) to the LU to conduct the linkage. In
order to overcome inference attacks by the LU on the
BFs, the counting Bloom filter (CBF)-based approach
(described in Section 3.3) can be applied where the LU
sequentially gets a CBF from the relevant set of parties
for each cluster of records. Using the CBF the LU can
calculate cluster similarity as equivalent to calculating
cluster similarity using individual BFs [24]. CBFs sig-
nificantly reduce the risk of inference attack compared
to BFs [24]. An inference attack allows an adversary to
map a list of known values from a global dataset (e.g. q-
grams or attribute values from a public telephone direc-
tory) to the encoded values (BFs or CBF) using back-
ground information (such as frequency) [42, 45]. The
only information that can be learned from such an infer-
ence attack using a CBF c of a set of x BFs (summed
over x parties) is if a bit position in c is either 0 or x
which means it is set to 0 or 1, respectively, in the BFs
of all x parties.
Proposition 4.1. The probability of identifying the un-
encoded (original) values of x (x > 1) individual
records Ri (with 1 ≤ i ≤ x) given a single CBF c
is smaller than the probability of identifying the unen-
coded values of Ri given x individual BFs bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ x.
∀xi=1Pr(Ri|c) < Pr(Ri|bi)
Proof: Assume the number of original (unencoded)
values that can be mapped to a masked BF pattern bi
from an inference attack is ng. ng = 1 in the worst
case, where a one-to-one mapping exists between the
masked BF bi and the original unencoded value of Ri.
The probability of identifying the original value given
a BF in the worst case scenario is therefore Pr(Ri|bi) =
1/ng = 1.0 [45]. However, a CBF represents x BFs and
thus at least (in the worst case) x original (unencoded)
values, which leads to a maximum of Pr(Ri|c) = 1/x
with x > 1 (when x = 1, then c ≡ bi). Hence,
∀x
i=1
Pr(Ri|c) < Pr(Ri|bi).
Further, the collusion-resistant secure summation
protocols described in [24, 47] can be used to over-
come the risk of collusion among the parties in order to
learn about another party’s data. We also use the cryp-
tographic long term key (CLK) encoding [35] as a BF
hardening method, where QID values of a record are
hash-mapped into a record-level BF. This approach im-
proves privacy against inference attacks by decreasing
the probability of suspicion [45].
4.3. Linkage Quality Analysis
Our MP-PPRL protocol allows approximate match-
ing of QID values, in that data errors and variations are
taken into account depending upon the minimum sim-
ilarity threshold st used. Further, our protocol allows
subset matching by identifying matching records across
any subset of databases. This improves the linkage qual-
ity of MP-PPRL where records of a single entity can be
either in all databases or in a subset of databases only
(which is often a realistic scenario in practical applica-
tions). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
approach that addresses subset matching for MP-PPRL.
The two proposed methods of early and late one-
to-one mapping in the incremental clustering approach
have a trade-off between complexity and linkage accu-
racy. As analyzed in Section 4.1, the early mapping
approach has lower computational complexity than the
late mapping approach. In the following, we analyze the
linkage quality of these two mappings.
Conducting early one-to-one mapping in every iter-
ation before merging clusters significantly reduces the
computation complexity (as discussed in Section 4.1).
However, this approach might reduce linkage quality,
because when conducting optimal one-to-one mapping
with Pi’s records then only the records from the previ-
ous parties (P1 to Pi−1, with 1 < i ≤ p) are considered.
In contrast, the late one-to-one mapping is conducted
for each party Pi’s records considering records from all
other parties P j, with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ p and i , j. Therefore,
late mapping can improve linkage quality at the cost of
more comparisons.
In addition, the linkage quality of our protocol de-
pends on the blocking and the deduplication techniques
applied on each database. The higher the quality of
deduplication results the better the one-to-one mapping
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achieved in our approach will be, leading to higher link-
age quality. The parties can also be ordered using dif-
ferent ordering functions considering the known quality
of their databases or the quality of deduplication results,
such that the best quality database is processed first, as
the initial clusters will then be of higher quality leading
to higher quality clustering in the later iterations [41].
Similarly, the average similarity function we use adds
a masked record to a cluster if its similarity on aver-
age is high with all masked records in the cluster. Dif-
ferent similarity functions, such as minimum similarity
(known as complete linkage), where a masked record
needs to have a high similarity with all masked records
in the cluster, or maximum similarity (single linkage),
where a masked record needs to have a high similarity
with at least one masked record in the cluster, would
have different impacts on the linkage quality. We leave
investigating the impact of different ordering and simi-
larity functions on the linkage quality and efficiency as
a future work.
5. Experimental Evaluation
We empirically evaluate the performance of our MP-
PPRL protocol (named as AM-Clus) with the two pro-
posed variations, early mapping (EMap) and late map-
ping (LMap), as well as the baseline greedy mapping
(GMap), in terms of scalability, linkage quality, and
privacy. In the following sub-section we first describe
the datasets we use in our evaluation. In Section 5.2 we
discuss the baseline methods to which we compare our
proposed clustering approaches, and in Section 5.3 the
evaluation measures we employ in our experiments. In
Section 5.4 we then describe our experimental setting,
and in Section 5.5 we provide an extensive discussion
of the results we obtained in these experiments.
5.1. Datasets
One problem with regard to datasets for evaluating
MP-PPRL approaches is that there are no datasets avail-
able that are generated frommultiple parties. Therefore,
the general approach to conduct experiments is using
multiple datasets sampled with overlap from a single
large dataset. We conducted our experiments on three
collections of datasets (including a health dataset):
(1) NCVR: A set of datasets generated based on
the North Carolina Voter Registration (NCVR) database
(available from https://dl.ncsbe.gov/). We ex-
tracted 5,000 to 1,000,000 records for 3, 5, 7, and 10
parties with 25% of matching records across all parties
and 25% of matching records across subsets of parties.
Note that these datasets are different than the NCVR
datasets used for the experimental evaluation conducted
in [23, 24] for the MP-PPRL approaches that allow full-
set matching only (not subset matching). The difference
is that these datasets contain 25% of matching records
across any subset (of different sizes) of parties and 25%
of matching records across all parties, whereas in the
datasets used by [23, 24] 50% of matching records ap-
pear across all parties.
We also sampled 10 datasets each containing 10,000
records such that 50% of records are non-matches and
5% of records are true matches across each different
subset size of 1 to 10 (1, 2, 3, · · · , 9, 10), i.e. 45% of
records are matching in any 2 datasets while only 5%
of records are matching in any 9 out of all 10 datasets.
Ground truth is available based on the voter registration
identifiers to allow linkage quality evaluation.
We generated another series of datasets for each of
the datasets generated above, where we included 20%
and 40% synthetically corrupted records into the sets
of overlapping/matching records (labelled as ’Corr-20’
and ’Corr-40’ in the plots, respectively) using the GeCo
tool [48]. For example, if p = 10 datasets containing
10,000 records each are linked where 5,000 records are
matching across at least 2 of these datasets (minimum
subset size is 2 in this example), then 1,000 and 2,000
records from these set of true matches are corrupted,
respectively. We applied various corruption functions
from the GeCo tool on randomly selected attribute
values, including character edit operations (insertions,
deletions, substitutions, and transpositions), and optical
character recognition and phonetic modifications based
on look-up tables and corruption rules [48]. Since the
matching records (either one or many in the set chosen
randomly) are corrupted, the linkage quality will drop
which allows us to evaluate how real data errors impact
the linkage quality.
(2) NCVRT: We have downloaded the NCVR
database every second month since October 2011 and
built a combined temporal database of 26 such datasets
(i.e. 26 snapshots) each containing over 5 million
records of voters [49]. Voter registration identifiers are
unique which provides ground truth for evaluation. This
real temporal dataset allows conducting large-scale ex-
periments for MP-PPRL assuming each snapshot corre-
sponds to the dataset from one party (p = 26 parties).
(3) NSWE: The third dataset is a real New South
Wales (NSW) emergency presentations dataset from
Australia. A previous study that evaluated our proposed
method on this sensitive data by the Centre for Data
Linkage at Curtin University provided the presented
results [50]. In this study, subsets of NSWE dataset
13
were extracted for 5 parties each containing more than
700,000 records with no duplicates. These datasets
were linked by the Centre for Health Record Linkage
in Sydney providing ground truth for the linkage [33].
5.2. Baseline Methods
As reviewed in Section 6, only two MP-PPRL tech-
niques are available for approximate matching of string
data using probabilistic data structures [23, 24]. We
use these two as the baseline approaches to compare
our proposed approach as they are closely related to our
work. We name these approaches as AM-BF and AM-
CBF for the approximate matching approaches based
on BF [23] and CBF [24], respectively.
5.3. Evaluation Measures
We evaluate the complexity (scalability) of linkage
using runtime and memory size required for the link-
age. The quality of the achieved linkage is measured us-
ing the precision, recall, and F-measure, calculated on
classified matches and non-matches, that have widely
been used in record linkage, information retrieval and
data mining [4]. The ground truth is available for all
datasets with known labels of true matches/clusters (ei-
ther from all p databases for full set matching or subset
(< p) of databases for subset matching). For example,
the NCVR-10000 datasets for p = 10 parties contain
25%, i.e. 2,500, record sets (clusters) as true matches
from all p = 10 parties and 25%, i.e. 2,500, record sets
as true matches from any subset (< 10) of parties.
Based on the classification of the number of true
matching record pairs, TM, from each resulting clus-
ters (either from all p or subsets of databases), false
matches, FM, and false non-matches, FN, the linkage
quality measures are defined as below [4]:
1. Precision: the fraction of record pairs in all clusters
classified as matches by the PPRL classifier that
are true matches: TM/(TM + FM)
2. Recall: the fraction of true matches in clusters that
are correctly classified as matches by the classifier:
TM/(TM + FN)
3. F-measure: harmonic mean of Precision and Re-
call: 2× (Precision×Recall)/(Precision+Recall)
We use the F-measure in our evaluation to allow com-
parison with related earlier publications. We however
note that recent research [51] has identified some prob-
lematic issues when the F-measure is used to compare
record linkage classifiers at different similarity thresh-
olds. This work is ongoing and there is currently no
accepted appropriate new measure that combines preci-
sion and recall into one single meaningful value.
In line with other work in PPRL [24, 30, 35], we
evaluate privacy using disclosure risk (DR) measures
based on the probability of suspicion Ps, i.e. the like-
lihood a masked (encoded) database record in DM can
be matched with one or several known values in a pub-
licly available global database DG. The probability of
suspicion for a masked record rM , Ps(r
M), is calculated
as 1/ng where ng is the number of possible matches in
DM
G
to the masked record rM . We conducted a linkage
attack [45] assuming the worst case scenario ofDG ≡ D,
and the BF hash functions are known to the adversary.
Based on such a linkage attack, we calculate
1. mean disclosure risk (DRMean): the average risk
(
∑|DM |
i
Ps(r
M
i
)/|DM|) of any sensitive value in DM
being re-identified [45]
2. marketer disclosure risk (DRMark): the proportion
of masked records in DM that match to exactly one
masked record in DG (|{r
M
i
∈ DM : Ps(r
M
i
) =
1.0}|/|DM|)
5.4. Experimental Setting
Following earlier BF work in PPRL [6, 23, 35], we
set the parameters as BF length l = 1, 000, the num-
ber of hash functions k = 30, and the length of grams
(substrings of QIDs) is q = 2. Soundex-based pho-
netic encoding [4] is used as the blocking function. The
last name is used as the blocking key for the scalability
experiments for the different sizes of NCVR datasets,
while a combination of first and last name attributes
are used as the blocking key attributes for other ex-
periments on the NCVR and NCVRT datasets due to
the large runtime requirement. Using last name as the
blocking key results in larger blocks and thus requires
longer runtime. However, larger blocks improve privacy
against frequency attacks on blocks, which is preferred
in privacy-preserving applications [8].
We also used an existing multi-party private block-
ing function using bit-trees [30] on the surname and
date of birth attributes for linking the NSWE datasets.
Soundex-based phonetic blocking on first and last
names provides an average pairs completeness (simi-
lar to recall it calculates the percentage of true matches
found in the candidate record sets generated by a block-
ing method [4]) of 0.98 and the bit-trees-based block-
ing on surname and date of birth values provides 0.96
pairs completeness. We used the first name, last name,
city, and zipcode attributes as QIDs for the linkage
of the NCVR and NCVRT datasets, while first name,
surname, date of birth, sex, address, and postcode are
used as QIDs for linking records in the NSWE datasets.
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Figure 7: Comparison of (a) runtime and (b) F-measure for the early mapping (EMap), late mapping (LMap), and baseline greedy
mapping (GMap) approaches of incremental clustering on NCVR datasets.
These attributes are commonly used personal identify-
ing attributes for linking records across databases [4].
We implemented both our proposed approaches and
the competing baseline approaches in Python 2.7.3, and
ran all experiments on a server with four 6-core 64-bit
Intel Xeon 2.4 GHz CPUs, 128 GBytes of memory and
running Ubuntu 14.04. The programs and test datasets
(except NSWE) are available from the authors.
5.5. Discussion
In this section we discuss the results of our experi-
mental study.
i. Comparison of different mapping: In Figure 7 (a)
we compare the runtime for our approach based on
greedy (baseline), early and late mappings (labelled as
GMap, EMap and LMap, respectively), while in Fig-
ure 7 (b) we compare their F-measure results on the
NCVR datasets. The proposed early and late map-
pings require similar or lower runtime than the base-
line greedy mapping, and as expected the F-measure
achieved with early and late mappings are significantly
higher than greedy mapping. Early mapping requires
comparatively lower runtime than late mapping at the
cost of a small loss in linkage quality. Since the loss
in F-measure is not very significant, we use the early
mapping-based approach as a default mapping in the
rest of our experiments.
ii. Similarity threshold vs. linkage quality: The F-
measure achieved with different similarity thresholds
on the NCVR datasets for p = 10 is shown in Fig-
ure 8 (a). The F-measure increases with the threshold
up to 0.8 on all datasets and then drops due to the loss
in recall. As can be seen, the F-measure increases with
larger thresholds on non-corrupted datasets (which re-
quire only exact matching) while it starts to decrease at
a certain point on the corrupted datasets (which require
approximate matching due to errors and variations). We
therefore set the default threshold value to 0.8 in our ex-
periments. When the datasets are corrupted, the linkage
quality becomes very low with increasing dataset sizes.
These results indicate that more advanced classification
techniques instead of a simple threshold-based classifi-
cation are required to improve the linkage quality in the
presence of real-world data errors [4].
iii. Minimum subset size vs. linkage quality: The
F-measure of linkage achieved with different minimum
subset sizes on the NCVR datasets for the early, late,
and greedymappings are shown in Figure 8 (b). Linking
with smaller minimum subset size is more challenging
than larger minimum subset size, as identifying matches
across 2 or more datasets is more difficult than all 10
datasets, for example, due to the large number of combi-
nations of datasets to be checked for matches. Our pro-
posed mapping approaches outperform the greedy map-
ping significantly for smaller minimum subset sizes.
As expected, the linkage becomes more challenging
with corrupted data using any mapping methods, when
identifying records that match across larger number of
databases compared to smaller subsets of databases.
With increasing number of databases, more corrupted
records are included in the matches, resulting in signif-
icant loss of linkage quality. While data errors in real
data are possible, the degree of corruption would be
probably relatively low. According to the real NSWE
and NCVRT datasets, the quality of data is very high
with less than 1% linkage errors when a probabilis-
tic two-database matching technique is applied on the
unencoded NSWE dataset [52] and around 10% er-
ror in the NCVRT dataset. We have tested relatively
pessimistic scenarios by synthetically including 20%
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Figure 8: F-measure of linkage for (a) different similarity thresholds on NCVR-10K, 100K, and 1M datasets and (b) different
minimum subset size on NCVR-10K subset datasets (as described earlier) for p = 10.
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Figure 10: Linkage results on real large-scale datasets (NCVRT-1M (p = 26), NCVRT-5M (p = 26) and NSWE (p = 5)) in terms
of (a) scalability and (b) linkage quality.
and 40% corruption to the matching records in NCVR
datasets. The results on the corrupted datasets indi-
cate that achieving high linkage quality in the pres-
ence of large amount of data errors is a big challenge,
which needs to be mitigated through appropriate pre-
processing techniques as well as clerical review possi-
bly using active learning techniques [1].
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iv. Scalability: We next evaluate the scalability of
our protocol for different dataset sizes on the NCVR
datasets in Figure 9. When a combination of first and
last name (labelled as FName and LName, respectively
in the figure) attributes are used as blocking keys (BK),
the resulting block sizes become small, making our pro-
tocol highly scalable in terms of runtime and memory
size to large datasets from multiple parties. However,
when only the last name attribute is used as the BK our
protocol shows a quadratic trend with the size and num-
ber of the datasets. The experiments on larger datasets
of 500K and 1M with one attribute as BK required very
large runtime due to the larger block sizes, and therefore
we did not conduct this set of experiments due to time
limitation. Advanced blocking and filtering techniques
are therefore required to further reduce the computa-
tional complexity of large-scale multi-party linkage.
v. Large-scale linkage: We conducted large-scale ex-
periments of our approach on the NCVRT and NSWE
datasets. As can be seen in Figures 10 (a) and (b), we
are able to link multiple large datasets and achieve high
linkage quality, which shows the viability of our ap-
proach for large-scale MP-PPRL applications. Since
multi-database linkage requires an additional step of
clustering (or mapping) after pair-wise matching, in-
vestigating other better clustering techniques that can
achieve improved linkage quality is subject to further
research. However, as shown in Figure 10 (a), the run-
time required for linking such large multiple datasets is
higher (even though it is significantly better compared
to the baseline methods, as will be discussed below) and
therefore more advanced computational methods, such
as distributed computing and parallel processing, need
to be investigated to further improve the efficiency of
MP-PPRL.
vi. Comparison with baseline: We next compare our
approach with the baseline approaches in Figure 11 in
terms of scalability and linkage quality. As can be seen
in Figure 11 (a), our approaches (EMap and LMap)
require lower runtime for linking a large number of
databases, where the runtime does not increase signif-
icantly with p compared to AM-BF. The AM-BF ap-
proach requires lower runtime for linking smaller num-
ber of databases, however it increases exponentially
with larger p. We were unable to conduct experiments
for this approach on the NCVR-100K datasets due to
excessive memory consumption with the exponential
number of comparisons required by this approach. The
AM-CBF approach is more scalable than AM-BF for
linking a larger number of databases. This is because
the improved communication patterns with CBF reduce
the exponential growth with p down to the ring size r,
where r < p [24]. However, our proposed methods re-
quire even lower runtime than AM-CBF and is more
scalable with increasing p.
As shown in Figure 11 (b), our approaches (EMap
and LMap) achieve substantially higher F-measure re-
sults compared to all baseline methods on both non-
corrupted and corrupted datasets by identifying match-
ing records not only across all databases but also across
subsets of databases. We also compared the F-measure
of all these approximate matching approaches with an
exact matching MP-PPRL protocol [28], and as ex-
pected the approximate matching approaches outper-
form it on corrupted datasets.
vii. Disclosure risk results: As shown in Figure 12,
the CBF-based masking consistently has lower mean
and marketer disclosure risk than BF-based masking
(as we discussed in Section 4.2). Therefore, CBF-
based masking provides improved privacy than BF-
based masking. This means that the same privacy re-
sults can be achieved by our protocol in terms of mean
and marketer disclosure risks as with other CBF-based
approaches [24] in the worst case.
This comparative evaluation shows that ourAM-Clus
approach outperforms existing approaches in terms of
scalability and linkage quality, while providing bet-
ter/similar privacy results.
6. Related Work
Various techniques have been proposed in the lit-
erature tackling the problem of PPRL, as surveyed
in [1, 8, 35, 53]. However, most of these approaches
are limited to linking only two databases, and only few
approaches have considered linking data from multiple
databases (MP-PPRL). Neither of these techniques al-
low subset matching for MP-PPRL where records that
match across subsets of databases are also identified in
addition to records that match across all databases.
A secure multi-party computation approach using an
oblivious transfer protocol was proposed by O’Keefe et
al. [54] for PPRL on multiple databases. While prov-
ably secure, the approach can only perform exact match-
ing (i.e. variations and errors in the QIDs are not con-
sidered). Kantarcioglu et al. [55] introduced a MP-
PPRL approach for categorical data to perform secure
equi-joins (exact matching) on k-anonymous databases,
where the QIDs of a record are similar to at least k other
records in the database [56]. An exact matching ap-
proach for categorical data was recently proposed by
Karapiperis et al. [7] using a Count-Min sketch data
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Figure 12: Comparison of (a) mean and (b) marketer disclosure risk measures for BF and CBF encoding methods on NCVR
corrupted (Corr) and non-corrupted (No-corr) datasets.
structure. Sketches are used to summarize the local
set of elements which are then intersected to provide
a global synopsis using homomorphic operations and
symmetric noise addition techniques [2, 44]. Another
exact matching approach for MP-PPRL using Bloom
filter (BF) encoding was introduced by Lai et al. [28],
where a conjuncted BF is jointly constructed by all par-
ties to identify matching records.
All the MP-PPRL techniques described above are
not practical in real applications as they allow only ex-
act matching or matching of categorical data. Vatsalan
and Christen extended Lai et al.’s exact matching ap-
proach [28] to develop an approximate matching so-
lution for MP-PPRL [23] by using BFs and a secure
summation protocol [2, 44] to distributively calculate
the similarity of a set of BFs from different parties.
A recent approach for approximate matching in MP-
PPRL based on Counting Bloom filter (CBF) was pro-
posed by Vatsalan et al. [24]. BFs from p different
databases were summarized into a single CBF by ap-
plying a secure summation protocol. Neither of these
MP-PPRL approaches, however, supports identifying
matching records in subset of parties.
Only limited grouping techniques have been devel-
oped to identify a set of matching records from multiple
databases in the literature. Merge-based grouping sim-
ply groups or merges into one set all the records that
have a similarity above the threshold [57]. The greedy
best link approach proposed by Kendrick [27] links each
incoming record to the group that has the highest sim-
ilarity with the incoming record. An improved version
of the best link approach was later proposed by Ran-
dall et al. [26], which is referred to as weighted best
link. In this approach all the records in the incoming
file are first linked with the matching group of records,
and then they are amalgamated according to the order
of their weights. The advantage of the weighted best
link approach is that it does not depend on the order of
incoming records. However, the results depend on how
the weights are calculated. Our proposed incremental
clustering approaches are not only independent of the
ordering of records but also the weights of links.
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Scalability of PPRL has been addressed through the
development of private blocking functions [22, 58, 59],
and the more recently proposed summarization algo-
rithms [60]. However, the number of comparisons re-
quired for multi-party linkage remains very large even
with such existing private blocking and filtering ap-
proaches employed [23, 30]. Recent work by Vat-
salan et al. [24] proposed improved communication pat-
terns for reducing the number of comparisons for CBF-
based MP-PPRL. The naı¨ve computation complexity of
MP-PPRL techniques is exponential in the number of
records per database (np, assuming n records in each of
the p databases). The improved communication patterns
developed by Vatsalan et al. [24] reduce this exponen-
tial growth with p down to the ring size r (with r < p).
In contrast, our proposed approach efficiently performs
subset matching with a quadratic computation complex-
ity in the size and number of databases (O(n2 · p2)),
which allows large-scale MP-PPRL.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a scalable MP-PPRL protocol that
is highly efficient for practical applications, such as
health data linkage, and it improves the linkage quality
compared to existing MP-PPRL approaches that only
allow identifying matching records across all databases
and do not support subset matching. Our protocol uses
graph-based incremental clustering to achieve efficient
identification of matching records across all and subsets
of large databases.
An experimental evaluation conducted on large real
datasets (including 26 voter registration databases each
containing over 5 million records and 5 real emergency
admissions datasets each containing around 700,000
records) shows that our approach is practical for real
large-scale MP-PPRL applications. Our approach out-
performs existing MP-PPRL approaches in terms of
linkage quality and scalability.
In future work, we aim to investigate how existing
clustering algorithms for record linkage [16, 17, 18,
61, 62] can be adapted for MP-PPRL. One important
direction of this work is to study incremental cluster-
ing for dynamic data matching in MP-PPRL [63]. We
also plan to evaluate the impact of pre-processing tech-
niques, especially dealing with missing values [64], on
the performance of privacy-preserving clustering. An-
other direction is to study how incremental clustering
can be parallelized to improve scalability of large-scale
MP-PPRL. Investigating other advanced mapping, en-
coding, similarity, and classification functions (includ-
ing relational clustering and collective classification [4])
for clustering-based MP-PPRL would also be interest-
ing directions for future work.
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